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Cryptographic technology1 holds the potential to help solve problems
of information security within computing and information technology.
Realizing this potential depends on many factors, including patent law.
When exclusive rights for cryptographic technology impact interoperabili-
ty, technology diffusion or standardization, these supply-side influences
undercut what is oftentimes fickle market demand for data security. Users
want their data in their increasingly ubiquitous, mobile and powerful com-
puting devices. They want data security if it is easy and transparent. Devel-
opers and manufacturers want reduced production costs and the feature
advantages of embeddable cryptographic technology with positive network
effects. Patent law allows the owner of a valid patent some possibility of
control over the technology claimed in the patent. This control can some-
times limit or skew standardization and slow diffusion of interoperable
technology.
The rise of patenting for cryptographic techniques 2 mirrors the general
increase in software patenting.3 Scholars have not reached consensus that
the patent system has been beneficial for information technology as com-
pared to traditional industrial technology areas, such as the pharmaceutical
field.4 Patenting cryptography can influence self-ordering 5 and reordering
* Greg Vetter is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Houston School of Law.
1. Cryptography is "the art and science of keeping messages secure." BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY 1 (2d. ed. 1996). For a discussion of cryptography, see, for example., David Banisar,
Stopping Science: The Case Of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 253, 254 (1999); A. Michael Froom-
kin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 709, 713 (1995); Marcus Maher, International Protection of U.S. Law Enforcement Interests in
Cryptography, 5 RICH. J.L. & Tech. 13 (1999).
2. Brian Spear, Cryptographic Patents: at War and in Peace, 22 WORLD PATENT INFO, 177,
180-81 (2000).
3. For a discussion of software patents, see, for example, Kevin Afghani & Duke W. Yee, Keep-
ing it Physical: Convergence on A Physicality Requirement for Patentability of Software-Related
Inventions under the European Patent Convention and United States Law, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 239,
241 (2008); John R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1589-90 (2007); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from
the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (2007).
4. BRUCE LEHMAN, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM (2003),
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/lehman.pdf.
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within information technology because cryptographic systems are increa-
singly fundamental technology. 6 The demand for information security is
growing as everyone's dependence on computing deepens while consumers
and businesses alike realize the consequences of lost or stolen data. Devel-
opers and manufacturers, as well as governments, all have a stake in solu-
tions that facilitate standardized, embeddable cryptography. 7 The path
toward that outcome will likely feature both collaborative and contentious
responses, such as collaboration via patent pools and standard setting, or
contention by product differentiation based on cryptographic capability and
patent portfolio building.
I. SOFTWARE PATENTS AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
To use the U.S. patent system to protect technology, such as crypto-
graphy, one applies for a patent with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and writes one or more "claims" to define the scope of exclusive
right. A valid claim of an issued patent allows its owner to exclude others
from making, using and selling what the claim covers. 8 In a practical sense,
most cryptography will be deployed via software. Thus, many patent
claims covering cryptography are method claims that recite a series of steps
that comprise the method. Thus, cryptography is inherently algorithmic in
ways similar to how software is algorithmic. A claim to a cryptographic
method written in broad language without reference to software can be
infringed, assuming the claim's validity under patent law, by software op-
erated by a third party. For example, if that third party's software "makes"
or "uses" the method without permission from the patent owner, that owner
can bring a patent infringement action.
In this way, the patent owner has a possibility of control over the
technology covered by the valid claims in a patent. The more patents a
particular person holds, with more valid claims in each, the greater the
possibility of control if the claims cover the technology desired in the mar-
ketplace. While applying for patents (an activity called "patent prosecu-
5. Early theoretical discussion of self-ordering can be found in Hayek. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
6. BERT-JAAP KooPs, THE CRYPTO CONTROVERSY 33 (Kluwer Law International: The Hague
1999).
7. Besides its influence on data security, cryptography triggers other policy issues, such as
privacy from government surveillance. See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 71-75 (1996).
8. The patent right includes other exclusionary rights, but they are omitted for simplification. 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2006). The doctrine of "exhaustion" in patent law is a limitation on the proposition given
in the text. For example, once a chattel has been unconditionally sold under the authority of the patent
owner, the owner can no longer exclude others from using and selling the chattel.
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tion") is expensive, the next part of this article will discuss the increase
over the last several decades of software patents generally and of crypto-
graphic patents in particular. Even with patent law doctrine waxing and
waning over that time as to the potential validity of software and crypto-
graphic claims, users of the patent system such as technology developers
and manufacturers have continued to patent cryptographic technology. The
continued upswing in patents is potentially understood in relation to the
hopes of manufacturers to gain control, leverage, and the upper hand in the
competitive and intertwined information technology markets that deploy
cryptography.
As further background for the next part, this part will briefly carica-
ture patent law's uneasy dance with certain subject matter from information
technology, particularly software and cryptography.
To obtain a patent, one must first invent something and apply to the
USPTO. That agency looks at five legal criteria called the elements of pa-
tentability9 to determine if a patent should issue: (1) statutory subject mat-
ter; (2) utility; (3) novelty and statutory bars; (4) non-obviousness; and (5)
objective disclosure requirements, such as enablement. Once the USPTO
issues a patent, it carries a presumption of validity.' 0 However, a patent can
be invalidated at any point in its life."l In a standard patent infringement
situation, the alleged infringer will attempt to invalidate the patent by
showing how the allegedly infringed claims do not actually fit one or more
of the five elements of patentability.
The first element of patentability is that the invention must be of pa-
tentable subject matter (sometimes called "statutory subject matter").
12
Patentable subject matter, stated in its strongest conception, includes "eve-
rything under the sun made by man" that is not already patented, except
three notable exceptions: abstract ideas, naturally occurring phenomena,
and laws of nature.13 Although one may not patent any of the three excep-
9. STEVEN A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK, 3:1 (2009).
10. For a discussion of the presumption of patent validity, see, Doug Lichtman, Rethinking Patent
Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007).
11. For a discussion of patent invalidation, see, Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects
of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2006).
12. For a discussion of patentable subject matter, see, for example, Lilly He, In Re Bilski En Banc
Rehearing on Patentable Subject Matter: Farewell to Business Method Patents?, 14 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 252 (2008).
13. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). There was also at one point in patent law a
fourth exception called "business methods," where the claims covered items such as an accounting
method or perhaps a method of demonstrating a product or a method of compensating a manager.
However, this exception is no longer applied by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998); accord In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane).
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tions, one may patent an application of one of those exceptions, like a com-
puter system that utilizes a mathematical equation or a man-made bacteria
that transforms a naturally occurring bacteria.14
Nevertheless, pure mathematical equations, by themselves, are not pa-
tentable because they fit within the abstract ideas exception to patentable
subject matter. 15 Thus, patenting software poses conceptual difficulties
because these inventions rely on algorithms. 16 However, the case law has
evolved to where a process can pass the statutory subject matter criteria if
the claimed process does not preempt a field or subfield of activity by pre-
senting a claim that is too abstract.
17
In this approach, cryptographic technology has two areas of difficulty
when measured against patent law's statutory subject matter requirements.
First, cryptography is itself an algorithmic science relying on math. Second,
it is often implemented in software. This does not mean that there cannot
be valid patenting of cryptographic technology. It only means that those
claims must be sufficiently non-abstract. How to measure such
non-abstractness is where the case law has waxed and waned over the last
several decades.
Aside from the unique difficulties with the statutory subject matter cri-
teria due to its exception for abstract ideas, software and cryptography are
otherwise evaluated against the other four criteria without notable difficul-
ty. By this I mean that the legal tests underlying these criteria do not have
particular niche doctrines that are particularly challenging for software or
cryptography. Thus, to evaluate whether a claimed cryptographic method
meets utility, 18 novelty, non-obviousness, 19 or enablement, follow the same
14. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (holding that a computer system that relies on a mathematical equation
is patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a man-made
bacteria that consumes oil is patentable subject matter).
15. For a discussion of patentability of mathematical algorithms, see, for example., David J.
Kappos, A Technological Contribution Requirement for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court
Precedent and Policy, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 152 (2008).
16. The Supreme Court originally determined that some inventions implemented with computer
software were not patentable because the claims were merely algorithms. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 587 (1978).
17. The Supreme Court retreated from Bensen and Flook by allowing claims implemented with
software to meet statutory subject matter as long as the algorithm used in the software was an applica-
tion of an abstraction with sufficient specificity, considering the invention as a whole, to not preempt
too greatly other uses of the algorithm. Diamond, 450 U.S. 175. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded in Bilski v. Kappos that for process claims the analysis should emphasize the degree of abstract-
ness whereby claims that are too abstract will not qualify as statutory subject matter because of their
potential to preempt a field of activity. 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010) (finding that claims to a method of hedg-
ing risk in purchasing commodities were too abstract to qualify as a process for patent protection).
18. For a discussion of the utility doctrine, see, for example, BECKER, supra note 9, at 4:2.
19. For a discussion of non-obviousness, see, Gregory N. Mandel Another Missed Opportunity:
The Supreme Court's Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex,
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legal analysis as those tests are applied across other technologies. This is
generally the case for patent law: it is mostly a unitary system that does not
vary dramatically in legal doctrine for different areas of technology. This
does not mean, however, that the appearance of patenting in a particular
technology has the same market or innovation effects as patenting in other
technologies or the same effect on the public domain.20 This is because
factors external to patent law, such as industrial structure and technology
deployment modes, will influence patent law's effect in a field.
II. THE INCREASE IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC PATENTS
Cryptography's story includes non-patent legal issues. The United
States government controls the export of cryptographic technology. 21 Basi-
cally, the more effective the cryptographic technology, the more stringently
the government regulates it. The details of the export regulations are
beyond this writing's scope, but cryptography's main public and press no-
toriety is from disputes about the extent of this regulation.22 There is a rich
literature reviewing the debates, which includes concerns by United States
developers that they will lose market share to foreign cryptography devel-
opers. Some foreign countries do not regulate cryptographic technology
export.
The other non-patent legal issue is that the United States government
is involved in defacto standard setting with respect to cryptographic tech-
nology. This technology leadership involves both the government's own
significant use of cryptography as well as its general interest in security for
the informational assets that support the economy.23 This governmental
role in selecting a cryptography standard for its use appears in the next
section discussing early, yet still important, cryptographic patenting. Ongo-
ing government standard-setting also influences patenting effects later as
well.
A. Pioneer Patents for Modern Cryptography
Modern cryptography emerged in the 1970's from new solutions to
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323 (2008).
20. For a discussion of the public domain, see, for example, Amanda Fitzsimmons, National Secu-
rity Or Unnecessary Secrecy? Restricting Exemption I to Prohibit Reclassification of Information
Already In The Public Domain, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'y 479 (2008).
21. See Commercial Encryption Export Controls, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Industry
and Security, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/encryption/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
22. See Froomkin, supra note 7, at 71-75.
23. See National Institute of Standards and Technology: Computer Security Division: Computer
Security Resource Center (CSRC), http://csrc.nist.gov/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
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the key exchange problem for encrypted communications. A cryptographic
function, whether complex and implemented in software or simple and
implemented by hand, uses a key to convert plaintext to ciphertext and to
reverse the operation when necessary. When the encryption's only use is to
keep data on one's hard drive secret, there is no need to share the key with
anyone else. Only the user needs the key when accessing the data. The
purpose of cryptography in that case is to keep everyone else from access-
ing the protected data. But when users want to communicate over an inse-
cure channel, such as the Internet, they can do so by sending ciphertext so
long as each user involved in the communication has the key. This creates a
"chicken and the egg" problem: how do I send the key, which must be kept
secret, to someone with whom I have never communicated when the only
channel to that person is insecure? 24
The cryptography system, where both sender and recipient must have
the secret key, is called "symmetric." The pioneer patents that spawned
modem cryptography and gave it applicability to the Internet did so by
splitting the key into a public part and a private part. This is why the sys-
tem is called public key cryptography. The sender looks up the recipient's
public key (which is available through the Internet),2 5 encodes a message
with it, sends the resulting ciphertext to the recipient over an insecure
channel (such as much of the Internet), and the recipient can use her private
key to decode the message. The discovery behind public key cryptography
was how to arrange the mathematics so that it was nearly impossible to
derive the private key from the public key. It is also nearly impossible to
derive the plaintext from the ciphertext and the public key. This innovation
arrived just as computers were becoming increasingly interconnected in a
commercial setting and sufficiently powerful to quickly solve the equations
required by these cryptographic functions.
24. Peter Wayner, A Patent Falls, and the Internet Dances, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at Tech.:
Cybertimes, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyberweekO90697patent.html.
25. Saying that the recipient's public key is on the Internet, or that the recipient has previously
sent the sender the recipient's public key, exposes another problem: verifying that the recipient is who
she says she is and that the public key is hers. Cryptography is also used against this problem to imple-
ment a "digital signature." This technique essentially inverts the public/private key system described in
the main text. To generate the digital signature, one cryptographically processes a signature-private-key
against some information about the recipient, including her public key. There is then a signa-
ture-public-key which is used to verify that the information originated from whoever had the signa-
ture-private-key. For full effectiveness, however, the digital signature system requires a trusted third
party to verify the recipient's digitally signed information. These authorities for the Internet are called
Certificate Authorities (CA). There can be a hierarchy or chain of CA so that they can cross-verify each
other. The CA issues a "certificate" which is "a computer-based record which: (1) identifies the CA
issuing it, (2) names, identifies, or describes an attribute of the subscriber, (3) contains the subscriber's
public key, and (4) is digitally signed by the CA issuing it." See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential
Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 50-57, 58 (1996).
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Two groups secured patent rights related to these innovations. Mar-
tin E. Hellman, a professor at Stanford, and his graduate students first pa-
tented an approach for generating a shared private key for a sender and
recipient using communications across an insecure channel. This is called
the Diffie-Hellman patent.26 Hellman and another graduate student also
patented the "split" key approach described above. This formed the basis of
the public key infrastructure system that underlies much of the Internet's
information security apparatus. 27 This second patent is known as the Hell-
man-Merkle patent.28 These patents are also known collectively as the
"Stanford Patents."
Following in part the work at Stanford, a group of three professors at
MIT patented an implementation of the public key approach. This patent is
known as the RSA patent, each of the letters standing for the first letter of
the last name of the three inventors.29 The acronym also became the name
of a Boston company that, as of 2009, is an important provider of informa-
tion security technology and products.30
These three patents are among the pioneer patents of modem crypto-
graphy. Another notable pioneer is IBM's Data Encryption Standard (DES)
patent. 31 This patented cryptographic technology was the United States
government standard for non-classified sensitive data for over twenty years
(from 1976 to 1997).32
The federal government is a big customer. When they specify a tech-
nology as their standard, vendors work to supply products implementing
the standard. But if the standard is patented, and the patent is held by a
third party such as IBM, do all of these vendors have patent infringement
liability to IBM if they sell products embodying the standard to the gov-
26. U.S. Patent No. 4,200,770 (filed Sept. 6, 1977), issuing in 1980 and expiring in 1997 (Dif-
fie-Hellman patent).
27. See Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix),
http://www.ietf org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009); The Open Group,
Public Key Infrastructure, http://archive.opengroup.org/public/tech/security/pki/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2009).
28. U.S. Patent No. 4,218,582 (filed Oct. 6, 1977), issuing in 1980 and expiring in 1997 (Hell-
man-Merkle patent).
29. U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 (filed Dec. 14, 1977), issuing in 1983 and expiring in 2000 (RSA
patent).
30. RSA Security Inc., http://www.rsasecurity.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
31. U.S. Patent No. 3,962,539 (filed Feb. 24, 1975), issuing in 1976 and expiring in 1993 (IBM
DES patent).
32. See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Commerce Secretary Announces New
Standard for Global Information Security, http://www.nist.gov/publicaffairs/releases/g01-111 .htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2009); see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 735-38 (1995) (discussing how DES
became the U.S. government standard and the controversy surrounding its selection).
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emment? The answer is yes-unless there is a license.
A license is a permission that acts as a defense in the case of a law
suit. The simplest example comes from property law: if I pass you a note
that says, "come on my front yard and let's play catch," I won't succeed in
suing you for trespass when you step onto my grass. Your defense is the
license, i.e., the permission I gave you in the note. I granted you permission
to violate a right I otherwise have: to exclude you from my property. Your
act was technically a trespass, but one that was licensed. Sometimes the
word "license" also means a contract spelling out this permission, along
with other promises between the parties.
In the case of DES, the government announced that IBM would grant
nonexclusive royalty-free licenses for use of the standard, even if the re-
sulting device, software, or technology infringed the DES patent.33 The
government needed IBM to do this so that vendors could develop and
supply products without fear of patent infringement liability. 34
The pioneer patents each hold a unique place in modem cryptogra-
phy's early history. The DES patent became notorious because it was the
government's standard. There was suspicion about a "back door," a con-
cern that aligned with separate but highly controversial United States gov-
ernment efforts in the 1990's to promulgate, through a variety of indirect
pressures, cryptography technology that gave government access to the
decrypting keys for law enforcement. 35
The RSA patent and the Stanford patents had some commercial activi-
ty spring from their technology. 36 In particular, the lineage of the RSA
patent led to a primary vendor in the marketplace for cryptographic tech-
nology, software, solutions, and systems as of 2009. 37 Unlike the DES
patent, the RSA and Stanford patents were not licensed under royalty-free
generally applicable terms. As a result, there was some occasional patent
litigation among developers and vendors. This litigation tended to follow
the pattern where the pioneer patent holders sought to assert their patents
against potential market entrants. 38 For a time, the pioneer patents were
33. Announcing Draft Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-3, Data Encryption
Standard (DES), and Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 2625, 2628 (Jan. 15, 1999).
34. See Froomkin, supra note 32, at 895-96 (discussing how in the early 1990's the U.S. federal
government's selected digital signature standard (DSS) was ignored by vendors until the government
was able to cause the general availability of a royalty-free license for the patents that covered the DSS).
35. Id. at 734-38.
36. See RSA Data Sec., Inc. v. Cylink Corp., Civ. No. 96-20094 SW., 1996 WL 107272, at *1-*3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1996).
37. RSA Security Products, http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=l 155 (last visited Dec. 18,
2009).
38. See, e.g., Schlafly v. Pub. Key Partners, No. Civ. 94-20512 SW, 1997 WL 542711, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997). In this case, an RSA-related company asserted its patent against another
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managed as a "pool" where complimentary technology holders
cross-licensed the patents and sometimes offered all the patents in the pool
as a licensing package to others.39 The pioneer patents were so broad that
they cast an influential shadow across the entire industry.40 Even so, there
was plenty of room to patent aspects of cryptography, as the next section
shows.
B. The Growth in Cryptography Patenting
In raw numbers, cryptography patenting has grown dramatically since
the pioneer patents issued. Table 1 below presents an assessment of the
growth in the quantity of patents issued in the United States system over
time that are assigned to cryptography under certain classes used by the
USPTO.
While the table shows substantial patenting increases each year, more
information would be necessary to understand the numbers in full context.
Undoubtedly, the increases are significant in their own right. One wonders,
however, how the patenting increase compares to: (i) research and devel-
opment expenditure increases for cryptography; (ii) increases in cryptogra-
phy products introduced; or (iii) increases in cryptography-implementing
code written and/or deployed. Another perspective would be to compare
increases in cryptography patenting to increases in all software patenting,
or to information technology patenting during the time frames presented in
Table 1 below. The goal would be to understand, among other questions,
whether the cryptography patenting increase is simply part of a larger phe-
nomenon, or whether it outpaces the general rise in information technology
patenting observed during the 1990's and early 2000's.
This article does not take the additional empirical steps suggested in
the preceding paragraph. Even without these comparative baselines, the
growth in cryptography patenting is fascinating. It illustrates that even with
the pioneer patents in the backdrop, the patent system allows for significant
patenting growth in a technology. 41 The Stanford Patents expired in 1997,
entity selling digital signature technology. The case went in RSA's favor, resulting in a determination
that the defendant should no longer sell the technology.
39. Edward J. Radio, Legal Issues in Cryptography, COMP. LAW, May 1996, at 1, 10.
40. RSA Laboratories, What Are the Important Patents in Cryptography?,
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2326 (last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (listing RSA's
description of the cryptography patents that have had or currently have an influence on the technology).
41. See generally Ronald J. Mann, Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1579, 1587 (2007) (arguing through empirical studies that the dramatic increase in software patenting
from the 80's to the 90's was a result of an increase in confidence in the availability of patent protection




and the DES and RSA patents expired in 1993 and 2000, respectively.
Even while the pioneer patents were active, there was still room in the
field of cryptographic technology for patents to issue. This is in part due to
the nature of the patent system. Most of these patents will never be liti-
gated, and thus are unchallenged as to their validity after they issue from
the USPTO. And while the USPTO applies the prior-art-based novelty and
obviousness criteria, it is well known that USPTO examiners spend a rela-
tively small amount of time on each patent application, perhaps between
one and three dozen hours.
Moreover, applicants can always claim narrowly, which increases the
possibility of issuance but decreases the likelihood that the patent will be
valuable. As patenting increases in a field of technology, patent attorneys
might be heard to say that the prior art in a field is "crowded." As patent
density increases, it can decelerate the rate of patenting because there is
accordingly more prior art to overcome for new applicants. Additionally, as
firms build substantial patent portfolios, other firms may be deterred from
entering that particular market sector.42 The result may be an aggregate
deceleration in the rate of patenting.
However, from 2005 to 2009, as suggested by the classes of crypto-
graphy patenting shown in Table 1, the software industry saw an increase
in software patenting. One possible explanation for this is that the increase
in the rate of software patenting is a function of the growth of software
products and services. 43 As a firm increases its available successful prod-
ucts or services it becomes more vulnerable to competitors desiring to enter
the market for them.44 In response, firms may increase their patent portfo-
lios. 45 While an information technology recession existed from 2000-2002
during the dot-corn era, thereafter there was a "rebirth of sales in many
areas of software and services." '46 This rebirth may be one explanation for
the increase in software patenting, and in particular the surge in cryptogra-
phy patenting.
The table also shows that the number of patents classified to crypto-
graphy in most cases at least doubled for each five-year period from 1980
to 2000. There were increases in the next five-year period, 2000 to 2004,
42. Id. at 1606.
43. Id. at 1600. While an increase in both products and services accelerates the rate of software
patenting, firms that specialize in putting more products into the market tend to have a bigger patent
portfolio as there is a higher risk of competitors infringing on available products rather than services.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Software & Information Industry Association, Packaged Software Industry Revenue and
Growth, http://www.siia.net/software/pubs/growth software05.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
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but not a doubling in all classes. From 2005 to 2009, cryptography patent-
ing again increased, almost doubling the amount of patents from the pre-
vious five-year period.
One cannot total the counts across columns in Table 1 to arrive at the
number of cryptography patents issued because some of the patents may be
classified in multiple classes/subclasses-meaning that they would be
counted multiple times in the total. 47 A little investigation and spot check-
ing for the extent of the overlap suggests that the total is around fifteen
thousand. Perhaps several thousand would have expired by the time of
publication of this writing.
The increase in patenting does not appear to have launched an equiva-
lent increase in cryptography patent litigation. The patent infringement
suits involving cryptography-those that persisted long enough to generate
a reported opinion from the federal court system-number only in the sev-
eral dozen since the early 1980's.
48
The character of these patent inflingement suits is typical of patent lit-
igation generally: developers suing other developers and/or their distribu-
tors. In other words, it is likely that only a small percentage of the
commercial disputes among cryptography technology providers resulted in
a patent infringement suit. This assumes many more disputes than suits, but
if the logic is correct, the most likely explanation is two-fold. First, parties
are probably willing to license their technology, perhaps to help promote
user adoption of the technology. Second, perhaps developers can readily
patent around the existing patents. This second reason is especially plausi-
ble when an entire field of technology is growing and many practical ad-
vances are occurring to apply the principles in a wide variety of
technological contexts.
For example, just because the pioneer patents discussed issues related
to cryptographic keys, this does not mean that there are not many opportun-
ities to claim new inventions for keys. A search in the USPTO's patent
database, around the time of this writing, for patents in the general crypto-
graphy class (denoted with the number 380) with the word roots "key" and
"manage" in the patent title returns one-hundred six results, with issue
dates beginning in 1981 and running through 2009.
49
47. The data in the table was obtained using the USPTO's public advanced search interface, which
limits the query text length and prohibits a combined query to get a true total.
48. This conclusion is based on a search and review of U.S. Federal court cases that were re-
ported, but did not necessarily establish precedent, and having terminology related to cryptography.
49. The Search test is: cl/380S and ttl/key$ and ttl/manage$. On March 22, 2009, this search in
the USPTO database returned one-hundred six results. One example is U.S. Pat. No. 6,738,905 (filed




In Table 1 below, which presents an assessment of the U.S. patents is-
sued that are classified to cryptography, of importance is the definition that
the USPTO assigns to the three classes that implicate most U.S. cryptogra-
phy patents: U.S. Class 380;50 U.S. Class 705;51 and U.S. Class 713.52
Thus, the footnotes give further details about those classes and the search-
ing within each. Specifically, the quantities reported under the columns in
classes 705 and 713 do not exclude patents reported in the counts of the
other column if they are classified in both, but do exclude patents reported
in class 380. On the other hand, the column reporting counts in class 380
will include any patents also additionally classified in either class 705 or
713. Fundamentally, two realities generate these complications. First, the
fact that a particular patent can, and often will be, classified into multiple
classes and subclasses. Second, there was a preference to undertake this
research using the most publicly available searching tool, the USPTO web-
site itself, and its searching tools limit the efficacy of the reported counts
50. U.S. Class 380 is defined as:
This class includes equipment and processes which (a) conceal or obscure intelligible infor-
mation by transforming such information so as to make the information unintelligible to a ca-
sual or unauthorized recipient, or (b) extract intelligible information from such a concealed
representation, including breaking of unknown codes and messages.
Class Definitions, Class 380, 380-1, http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc380/defs380.pdf (last
visited Dec. 17, 2009). Class 380 does not include all cryptography, however, because it excludes
cryptography in "the specific environments of (a) business data processing, or (b) electrical computer or
digital processing system support. Such subject matter is classified elsewhere in the classes." Id. Note
that in item (b) the word "support" means technical, internal operational capabilities that enable the
computer to function. Id. "Support" does not mean human assistance to help users with the computer or
digital processing system.
The search in Class 380 used the following search text in the USPTO's Advanced Patent
Search page, with the years changed accordingly for each entry in the table and setting the year filter
from 1790-present: 5SD/1/l/1970->12/31/1974 and cc11380/$
51. U.S. Class 705 is for data processing and calculation where "the apparatus or method is uni-
quely designed for or utilized in the practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or in the
processing of financial data." Class Definitions, Class 705, 705-1, http://www.uspto.gov/
go/classification/uspc705/defs705.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
The Search in Class 705 excluded patents in the Class 380 to prevent double-counting among
those two classes. The search in Class 705 used the following search text to target subclasses related to
cryptography in the USPTO's Advanced Patent Search page, with the years changed accordingly for
each entry in the table, and setting the year filter from 1790-present:
VSD/l/l/1970->12/31/1974 and (ccl/705/5? or ccl/705/6? or ccl/705/7? or ccl/705/8? andnot ccl/380/$J
52. The Search in Class 713 excluded the Class 380 and Class 705 patents to prevent double-
counting among those two classes. U.S. Class 713 is for the internal aspects of electrical computers and
digital processing systems, including items such as memory management, hardware interfacing, and
system security and protection. Class Definitions, Class 713, 713-1, http://www.uspto.gov/go/ classifi-
cation/spc713/defs713.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
The search in Class 713 used this search text to target subclasses related to cryptography in the
USPTO's Advanced Patent Search page, with the years changed accordingly for each entry in the table,
and setting the year filter from 1790-present:
SD/1/l/1970->12/31/1974 and ((ccl/713/15$ or ccl/713/16S or ccl/713/175 or cel/713/185 or
ccl/713/195 or ccl/713/205) andnot (ccl/705/5? or ccl/705/6? or cc1/705/7? or ccl/705/8? or ccl/380/$)A
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for absolute quantization purposes. For purposes of this article's argument,
the main point, however, is reasonably well-evidenced: the substantial
growth in cryptographic patenting.
Table 1: Patents Linked to Cryptographic Classifications in the U.S.
Patent System
USPTO Class 380 705 713
1970-74 155 3 7
1975-79 257 8 10
1980-84 310 25 16
1985-89 608 59 57
1990-94 1,145 106 199
1995-99 1,809 319 385
2000-04 2,155 638 1,106
2005-09 4,486 1,920 4,882
Total: 10,925 3,078 6,662
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PATENTS MOVING FORWARD
The USPTO's classification scheme for cryptography highlights its
embeddable characteristic and effectively optional nature for most systems
where it might be embedded. The broad cryptography class, number 380,
differentiates two classes-705 and 713-where cryptography is, respec-
tively, embedded in enterprise information technology or in the internals of
a computer or its operating system. By total patent classifications in Table
1 above, the patents issued and classified for the embedded classifications
probably outnumber those in the general class, assuming that the overlap
due to patents with multiple classifications does not upend this estima-
tion.5
3
53. The main text estimates that the total is around fifteen thousand, with perhaps several thou-
sand expired. In addition to these three classes, the inquiry examined scattered subclasses in ten other
classes not so directly tied to cryptography: section 380 is the class for cryptography, but 705 and 713
are the delivery methods of cryptography via computing devices and information systems. Among the
other ten examined classes, most had just a couple of subclasses that used cryptography (as opposed to
having direct emphasis placed on it, as was the case with class 380): 340, 358, 382, 386, 455, 463, 700,
902. Two sections-725 and 726-had many dozens of subclasses that might use cryptographic tech-
nology. Among the ten classes that were examined, within the searched subclasses, the inquiry esti-
mated that yet another approximately fifteen thousand patents could exist. All of the counts from
searches of these ten classes are on file with the author. Finally, it should be noted that the inclusion of
a subclass was based on an evaluation of the title of the subclass, not by extensive examination of all of
the patents assigned to the subclass. Some spot checking occurred during the inquiry, but the numerical
data reported herein is fundamentally based on the USPTOs classification scheme and is thus limited to
whatever categorization decisions the USPTO made on a patent by patent basis.
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The embeddable nature of cryptography, however, is more pro-
nounced than this comparison suggests: the technology is usually deployed
as part of a larger system for communications, computing or entertainment
delivery. For example, personal computers and notebook computers recent-
ly started providing internal smartcard readers where the smartcard is envi-
sioned to hold cryptographic key information and perform some
information security functions. Just because cryptography can be embed-
ded, however, does not mean that it always is: information technology sys-
tems provide plenty of value without the high degree of information
security modern cryptography promises. Their use has grown even in the
face of spotty and incomplete information security, as well as while patent-
ing for information security is on the rise.
Strategic or competitive policy responses to increased patenting
should keep in mind the challenge of gaining critical mass with an embed-
ded technology of wide applicability. An embedded component of a larger
system can infringe a patent claiming only the component. Thus, for exam-
ple, if a patent claim covers a smartcard interface method, a smartcard with
the method implemented in its software would infringe. Likewise, a note-
book computer would also infringe if it practices the method. A patent can
have a laser-beam focus, targeting some small component of an overall
system or device. But if making, using or selling that component is patent
infringement, then making, using or selling the entire system or device is
also infringement. If the component is critical to the overall system or de-
vice, the patent can inhibit the entirety even though its claims only cover
the component. Patent attorneys sometimes state this result as follows:
adding extra "elements" to a device that satisfies the claim does not avoid
infringement of the claim.
There are several related vehicles to minimize patents in the product
development and deployment landscape and to minimize the patent risk for
embedded cryptographic components: patent pools; privately governed
patent-aware standard setting organizations; and patent-aware government
driven standards. Cryptography has seen all three. The pioneer patents were
managed as a patent pool during the early 1990's. 54 In some patent pool
arrangements, a group of companies each agree to allow the others in the
group to use their patents under a cross-licensing arrangement. 55 The entire
pool is sometimes available to others to license, perhaps by joining the
54. Radio, supra note 39, at 10.
55. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting 12-13 (Soc. Sci. Research Network Working Paper 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so]3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=273550 (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
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group/pool, or perhaps at arms-length. 56
Standard setting organizations are closely related to patent pools. De-
pending on how the standard setting organization deals with intellectual
property, it may create mechanisms similar to patent pools by clearing a
zone defined by the standard where competing developers can operate
without fear of patent infringement liability from organization members.
Smart policy demands that practicing the standard does not infringe any
patents, or at least, it does not infringe any patents held by those organiza-
tions associated with, or who helped form, the standard. Within computing
generally there is a widely observed variety in how such organizations deal
with intellectual property: some organizations have done a good job setting
ground rules upfront for patents, while others have not, sometimes to the
detriment of the standard setting effort. 57 Good ground rules typically re-
quire standard-setting patent holders to commit in advance to at least rea-
sonable and nondiscriminatory ("RAND") licensing terms, as well as to
perhaps identify all the patents that might cover the standard.
A recent example of private standard setting for embedded crypto-
graphic functionality is the trusted computing initiative. The Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG) was formed in 2003 to develop a secure PC
architecture. 58 From this effort, personal computers have been available
since 2005 with Trusted Platform Module (TPM) security chips.59 TCG
56. Patent pool licensing varies based on industry and technology factors, so this article is not the
place to enumerate the possibilities. It suffices to note that pooling sometimes clears patents from
blocking the path of product deployment, but may create a number of problems including the incentive
for developers and suppliers to acquire patents in a race to gain leverage and influence within the pool.
See Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. REG. 359, 367-69 (1999)
("[platent pools are private contractual agreements whereby rival patentees transfer their rights into a
common holding company for the purpose of jointly licensing their patent portfolios."); Michael J.
Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 309, 324-26 (2002).
One well-known patent pool sometimes associated with data encryption is the DVD pool.
See DVD 6C Licensing Agency: Patent Catalogue, http://www.dvd6cla.com/catalogue.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2009). This patent pool, however, does not directly cover the well-known Content Scrambling
System (CSS)-a relatively weak cryptographic approach used by the entertainment industry to inhibit
DVD copying. See The Openlaw DVD/DeCSS Forum Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) List,
§ 2.11.2, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/dvd-discuss-faq.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
57. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1889, 1904-07, 1948 (2002) (describing "standard-setting organization intellectual property rules
as private ordering in the shadow of patent law," and noting that in "many industries IP owners regular-
ly cross-license huge stacks of patents on a royalty-free basis. These patents are used defensively rather
than offensively; their primary economic value is as a sort of trading card that reduces the risk that their
owner will be held up by other patent owners").
58. See Trusted Computing Group, https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home (last visited
Dec. 18, 2009); Bill Goodwin, Trusted Computing Could Lead to More Supplier Lock-in,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, Nov. 14, 2002, available at http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/
2002/11/14/190933/trusted-computing-could-lead-to-more-supplier-lock-in.htm.
59. See Trusted Computing Group Backgrounder, http://www.ict-economic-impact.com/images/
TCGBackgrounder_revised_01 2605.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter TCG Backgrounder].
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requires RAND licensing from its members. 60
The cryptographic capabilities in TPM arose from critical mass in
both demand-side need and supply-side feasibility. For the TCG, intellec-
tual property management facilitated the supply-side feasibility. As a con-
sortium of hundreds of companies, the TCG founding members had to
decide ex ante how to deal with intellectual property rights including patent
rights. The TCG operates as a non-profit corporation. Its bylaws prescribe
patent licensing conditions for member companies. The consortium's goal
is to develop a private standard with sufficient market potential for a band-
wagon effect: many companies build to the standard so user adoption
reaches critical mass with network economies. To do this, each member
agrees to license any patented technology it contributes. They must grant
licenses appropriate for the field of use as it maps to the consortium's stan-
dard. Also, when additions to the TCG specifications come from other
members, each member has a review period: if they do not withdraw from
the organization they are agreeing to license any patent claims that would
be covered. Thus, the TCG's bylaws implement a type of patent pool. It is a
standard setting organization with an embedded patent pool guarantee.
Besides recently-established standard setting organizations like the
TCG, there are a number of longstanding industry association standardizing
efforts. Within cryptography, one prominent organization is the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Standard setting by the IEEE
(or other industry associations) 61 needs patent-aware mechanisms similar to
those illustrated in the discussion about TCG. Even government promul-
gated standards must pay attention to patent law.
One of the pioneer patents, IBM's DES patent, was the government
standard for non-classified data for about twenty years. In the late 1990's
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) ran a competi-
tion for a new standard, which it called the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES). Its new standard became effective in 2001, specifying the Rijndael
algorithm. 62 The Rijndael algorithm was not believed to be covered by any
patents, and the cryptographers who submitted the algorithm did not desire
patent protection for it. In addition, the NIST had the following to say
about patents:
60. Id.
61. Besides the IEEE, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is an important standard setting
organization for cryptography. See Overview of the IETF, http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last
visited Dec. 18, 2009). The IETF manages the Public-Key Infrastructure standard. See Public-Key
Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix), http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.htm (last visited Dec. 18,
2009).
62. See Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Development Effort, http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/
aes/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
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NIST reminds all interested parties that the adoption of AES is being
conducted as an open standards-setting activity. Specifically, NIST has
requested that all interested parties identify to NIST any patents or in-
ventions that may be required for the use of AES. NIST hereby gives
public notice that it may seek redress under the antitrust laws of the
United States against any party in the future who might seek to exercise
patent rights against any user of AES that have not been disclosed to
NIST in response to this request for information.63
The AES efforts led to a significant number of products embedding
the AES algorithm and submittal of their implementation to the govern-
ment for conformity testing. Thus, the AES program not only promulgated
a patent-aware open standard, it has provided a certification for vendors
who wish to prove that their implementation works according to the stan-
dard.64 The number of certified implementations includes many hundreds
at the time of this writing. Certification was more plausible for vendors
because they did not have to be as concerned with patent infringement risk
for the AES algorithm. In this way, the government's patent-aware stan-
dard setting activity virtually eliminated patent risk for the core algorithm,
enabling developers to compete on non-patent benefits. It is also plausible
that the winning algorithm's anti-patent stance helped it in the NIST evalu-
ation.
In patent pooling and in private or public standard setting efforts, pa-
tents influence the competitive environment, but these mechanisms can
ameliorate direct blocking effects. In other words, while patents cast a sha-
dow on industrial self-ordering, they might not, under a patent-aware open
standard or a patent pool, prohibit technology deployment by those in the
pool or subscribing to the standard.
In the future, free and open source software sharing and collaborative
development techniques may also engender these effects for cryptography.
Open source software is a copyright-based licensing system. It requires that
those who distribute such software ensure its free and open nature by not
charging a royalty and by making the source code available. 65 While open
source software may have patent liability like any other technology, the
exposed source code is prior art that can inhibit future patent density. Open
source software can help the prior art for some programming technology
become "crowded," which makes future patenting more difficult or pro-
duces narrower patents in the future.66
63. Id.
64. See Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation List, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/
STM/cavp/documents/aes/aesval.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
65. See generally Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open Source Software, 2004
UTAH L. REV. 563.
66. The USPTO initiated an effort in early 2006 to systematically make open source software
2010]
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
The free and open source software movement has already indirectly
influenced cryptography patenting. IBM is the leading patent holder of
United States patents. In the early 2000's, IBM embraced the GNU/Linux
operating system and generally converted to certain aspects of the open
source software movement. The move was not altruistic. Open source
software is complementary to IBM's hardware and service offerings.
GNU/Linux is a more standardized and affordable operating system than
IBM's proprietary version of UNIX, and this makes IBM's offerings more
competitive. Due to its immersion in free and open source philosophy,
however, IBM re-evaluated which patents in its portfolio should be leve-
raged for product differentiation and which ones should be contributed,
royalty-free, to support open standards and open source software: in early
2005 it decided to make hundreds of patents freely available for use by
others. 67 It also pledged that any future patent contributions to an important
information technology standard setting organization, the Organization for
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), would be
freely available. The free and open source community applauded this move
because freely available patents are viewed as better than patents available
under RAND licensing terms (although better for the free and open source
software movement, it is not better than being patent free in the move-
ment's view). OASIS is the source of a number of technical standards in
the forefront of cryptography. 68 IBM saw benefits in helping clear the pa-
tent-dense field for cryptography to obtain critical mass, and these benefits
must have outweighed any potential benefit of following a product diffe-
rentiation strategy with the contributed patents.
Not all companies have IBM's business mix, however, so some will
choose the alternative to these cooperative approaches: product differentia-
tion using patents. Companies sometimes base marketing claims on the fact
that a "product is patented"--which really means that the company owns
available as searchable prior art for its examiners. John Markoff, U.S. Office Joins an Effort To Improve
Software Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/01/10/technology/1 Oblue.html.
67. Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Hopes to Profit by Making Patents Available Free, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/1 I/technology/Il ibm.html. The article reported
IBM's approach as follows:
[IBM] announced in January [2005] that it would make 500 patents-mainly for software
code that manages electronic commerce, storage, image processing, data handling and Inter-
net communications-freely available to others. And it pledged that more such moves would
follow. [In April 2005], the company said that all of its future patent contributions to the larg-
est standards group for electronic commerce on the Web, the Organization for the Advance-
ment of Structured Information Standards, would be free.
Id.
68. See OASIS Committees by Category: Security, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/
tccat.php?cat-security (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
[Vol 84:3
PATENTING CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY
patent(s) with claims that presumably cover the product. Touting the pa-
tent(s) as a marketing benefit is not the only way to use them competitive-
ly: competitors risk infringement if their designs fall within the claim
language. Some technology developers use portfolios of patents to create a
buffer zone around a new product where competitors perceive risk to enter.
One or two patents usually form a weaker buffer zone than a handful or
dozen(s) of patents. 69 In cryptography, some companies are following the
portfolio approach to technology differentiation. 70 This is typically effec-
tive when vendors already have significant market share and can license a
portfolio that comprehensively covers an important technological strand or
covers a user function end-to-end.
While many companies both in cryptography and in other fields build
patent portfolios, there is no consensus as to what ultimate effect this pro-
duces. 71 Proffered explanations range from shielding future in-house prod-
uct development and innovation, to having the portfolio available for cross-
licensing in a patent pool or standard setting organization, to defensive
patenting where the portfolio is an arsenal in the case of a patent litigation
war.72 Portfolio building will also "crowd" the prior art, making it more
difficult for new entrants to both obtain broad patents and design around
existing patents, unless the new company has a truly unique technological
advance.
Cryptography patenting has produced collaborative responses in pool-
ing and standard setting, and differentiating responses within portfolio
building. Sometimes the two responses combine: a developer may build a
portfolio for a differentiation strategy, but later decide to place the portfolio
into a pool or offer it as a standard.
69. See Emily Nelson, Toilet-Paper War Heats Up With New, Wet Roll, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2001, at BI (noting that for its new product, Cottonelle Fresh Rollwipes, Kimberly-Clark is "guarding
the roll and its plastic dispenser with about 30 patents").
70. See Certicom Intellectual Property, Certicom Overview Brochure, Certi-
com: Securing Innovation, http://www.certicom.com/index.php/certicom-intellectual-property (last
visited Dec. 18, 2009) ("The Certicom Patent Portfolio includes more than 350 patents and patents
pending worldwide ... [c]erticom is known for many patents related, but not limited to the area of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) "). Additionally, Voltage has recently been awarded five new
patents for encryption technology innovations. See Voltage Security, Voltage Security Awarded Five
New Patents for Critical Innovations in Encryption Technology, http://www.voltage.com/pressreleases/
PR070625.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
71. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (stating
that the U.S. patent system "is in danger of imposing an unnecessary drag on innovation by enabling
multiple rights owners to 'tax' new products, processes, and even business methods").
72. Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV.
961, at 996-97 & n.180 (2005) ("The only stable equilibrium response of IBM is to obtain a sufficiently
large portfolio of patents to induce Microsoft to enter into a formal or informal cross-licensing ar-
rangement under which neither side will sue the other for patent infringement.").
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This reflects a vibrancy and dynamism in the field as developers
perceive a growing market and try to meet the information security needs
of individual and corporate users. Corporate users and even individual us-
ers have a heightened appreciation of the need for information security,
even if at the individual level the propensity to take action toward greater
information security is fragile. Increased patenting is a marketplace fact for
this embeddable technology. Given that cryptography's primary uses are in
communications and information storage/delivery, it needs critical mass for
greatest effect. Critical mass on the Internet comes from the interoperability
of standards and the resulting beneficial network economies from greater
use.
The patent challenge to embedding cryptography is unlikely to go
away. New responses, such as approaches based on open source software
collaboration, may provide additional options for the future. Even as these
take hold, the evolving patent landscape for software and business methods
that began in the late 1990's continues to influence patenting in the field.
No amount of information security will hide that fact.
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